Multiple analyses have recently identified a “green backlash” in the EU’s environmental policy. The Guardian notes that “since the turn of the year, the U-turns and capitulations have come thick and fast” as “Brussels and national governments have been busily sounding a disorderly, panicked retreat on environmental targets” (The Guardian, 2024). The sheer number of “capitulations”, many of them little noted publicly compared to the attention that the Green Deal received at the start, is indeed impressive – especially in agriculture: the Sustainable Use Regulation (targeting a reduction of pesticides) is off the table. The use of glyphosate has been extended for 10 more years. European farmers are (again) exempted from fallow land rules. Where forests are concerned, attempts to define what is sustainable management have largely failed under the EU’s Taxonomy regulating sustainable finance. The Nature Restoration Law, praised as the biggest European nature conservation policy project since the Habitats Directive in 1992, is on the brink of death (Politico, 2024). On the other hand, environmentally significant policy projects relating mostly to global value chains and trade – such as the EU Deforestation Regulation or the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive – were recently approved.

A remarkable pattern is emerging from these developments. The recent faltering of policy initiatives protecting nature within the EU’s boundaries vis-à-vis the adoption of those that aim to protect nature globally caught my attention. It seems that a pattern of EU Environmental Policy Nimbyism is emerging: while policies target to protect nature globally, ambitions fade within the EU itself. The EU’s Green Deal seems to progressively hollow out from the inside - at least for forests and nature conservation.

How can we understand this pattern? Prominent explanations point to a changing political mood in Europe – exemplified by the farmer's protests. Connected to that are changing policy priorities responding to economic trouble and geopolitical threats. Yet, these explanations may not be sufficient given the emerging nuanced picture I described above. In the following, I present four hypotheses providing explanations for the current situation – two already established to some degree; two fully speculative. I then conclude with three principles that I argue need to be emphasized much more for the EU’s environmental policy project to remain meaningful.

Four hypotheses explaining the hollowing out of the EU Green Deal

Hypothesis 1: Changing Political Mood

Let’s first look into the most prominent hypothesis of the current policy backlash: the changing political mood in Europe. Europe is currently in a different political situation compared to the launching year of the Green Deal in 2019. The Covid pandemic shattered the continent. The European economy is again faltering after the Covid shock and a subsequent short recovery period. For two years, war is ongoing near the EU boarders. Migration remains a polarizing topic between and within EU countries. Under such conditions, anti-environment lobbies gain momentum, drawing on an overall shifting political mood to the right, and exploiting unease about bureaucratic policies – most visible in the famer’s protests. The – since last year – worryingly accelerating global warming trend receives less attention, quite a contrast to the Fridays for Future years 2018 and 2019. Hot war beating hot climate.

Establishing environmental legislation in the EU takes time, and if one follows this hypothesis it is bad timing that makes EU environmental legislation falter these days – in the eve of a European election that is expected to bring about a shift to the political right also at the EU level. And yet – why does the change in mood affect green trade policies targeting mostly the environment abroad less?

Hypothesis 2: Baptists–Bootleggers rational

The hollowing out of the Green Deal from the inside can be explained by a second complementary hypothesis looking into the interplay of environmental values and economic interests. This hypothesis focusses on a phenomenon labelled ‘Baptists-Bootleggers Coalitions’. Coined by the US Economist Bruce Yandle decades ago, such coalitions refer to an unlikely cross-value interest constellation during alcohol prohibition periods: Baptists supported the prohibition of alcohol with moral intentions – no liquor should be sold on Sundays. Yet, bootleggers were also supportive towards the ban of alcohol – they made their profits from selling liquor illegally (Yandle, 1999).

Transposed to regulatory environmental policy, Baptists represent environmental advocacy groups. They have a moral motivation to achieve environmental policy objectives – halting deforestation, conserving biodiversity, mitigating climate change. Bootleggers represent economic interest groups – industry or landowner lobbies. These groups are mostly interested in securing market shares and sustained profit, and they support environmental regulation only if it can be advantageous to their interests. Together they often are a winning coalition in the policy arena, because they suggest a win-win to policy makers, uniting environmental protection and economic profits.

Baptists-Bootleggers Coalitions are a prominent pattern in EU forest and nature policymaking. They have been identified for different policy projects ranging from the 2010 EU Timber to the 2023 EU Deforestation Regulation but could also be found in EU nature and climate policy (Sotirov et al. 2021, Berning and Sotirov 2024). Moreover, Baptists-Bootleggers thinking is at the core of the Green Deal’s ideology ecological modernization. The Green deal is narrated as a story about the possibility of environmental protection and economic growth going hand in hand. And it is this simplifying rationale – obscuring trade-offs between conservation and socioeconomics – combined with a Baptists and Bootleggers rationale that may also explain its current hollowing out. In short, facing trade-offs and socioeconomic costs, it is easier to protect the environment abroad than at home. This finding connect to a harmful pattern that is at the core of Baptist–Bootlegger policy making: the exclusion of those not being on the negotiation table. These can be smallholders, citizens at large, or foreign producers. Frankly, Cameroonian, Ghanian or Columbian smallholders are further away from Brussels than Dutch, French or German farmers.

The Baptists-Bootleggers hypothesis is well grounded in the literature on EU policy making. The following two hypotheses — “Planned Implosion” and “Counter Mobilization” — leave such safe ground. Let’s speculate!

Hypothesis 3: Planned Implosion

What if the fate of the Green Deal’s nature policy were not the outcome of unfortunate timing and shifting policy priorities, but intended from the start onwards?

The ecological modernization paradigm underlying the Green Deal has been criticized for being mostly driven by, or concealing, economic interests advancing green thinking only if it serves economic purposes. Effective conservation policies within the EU boundaries could counter such critique. Allegedly, Europe is willing to also protect the environment when it does not serve an immediate economic purpose – as argued repeatedly to advance nature protection laws also within the EU.

However, proof of such good intentions for forests and nature remains sparse under the Green Deal. We saw non-legally binding EU biodiversity and forest strategies full of ambitions, but we may not see a Nature Restoration Law. We saw non-binding guidelines on how to protect the remaining patches of old growth forests in Europe – the implementation of which are left each country’s discretion – but we see a legally binding regulation to stop deforestation, mostly targeting vast (tropical) forests abroad. We see non-binding guidelines for payment schemes for forest ecosystem services, but we see little signs of greening of the Common Agricultural Policy where about one third of the EU’s budget is being spent on. Is this pattern only bad luck or the outcome of bad timing? Or could it be the outcome of a major green(washing) policy targeted at other policy objectives, but meant to be only symbolic where it would compromise European producers’ interests? This would tie in with an interpretation of the European Green Deal as being more an attempt to restructure – or push back – free trade and globalization in the face of strong competition, while sailing under the flag of environmental protection.

Frankly, I cannot imagine this was the key intention of Europe’s environmental community. Yet, it could have been the intention of top-level strategists of the Green Deal from the start – in line with the Baptist-Bootlegger rationale. I would be happy to find out more!

Hypothesis 4: Counter Mobilization

Totally opposite to “planned implosion”, the current green backlash could hypothetically also be explained by the intention to prevent it – through counter-mobilization. With European elections ahead, could it be that environmental strategists purposefully delay flagship projects such as the Nature Restoration Law to mobilize their green constituency? Arguably, a bold hypothesis.

And yet: perceiving a shift towards an anti-environment mode may increase doubt amongst those citizens that have previously become sceptical towards a perceived hegemonic green project. In other words, we may find protesting farmers likable if we feel they aim to protect traditional rural livelihoods against elitist urban environmental bureaucrats that “have gone wild”. But do we still find them likable if we see them being successful? And if success means continuing the use of harmful pesticides or preventing the restoration of nature (whatever that may mean in detail)?

“Political mood” has always been something difficult to grasp. Discursively constituted, it escapes from full control, but is subject to discursive strategies at the same time. In many democracies, effective mobilization strategies targeting undecided voters make them feel that their vote challenges “the establishment”. So if Brussels bureaucrats get green, we support farmers; if they become grey, we support environmental regulation. Could painting grey also be a strategy to regreen Europe after the elections? Or to at least not let it become fully grey? Indeed a bold hypothesis.

Can we turn the tide? A plea for transparency, participation, and environmental justice

What can we learn from the puzzle around the faltering Green Deal?

Obviously, we need to go beyond daring hypotheses. There is much room for social science research, and it is up to us to carve out the mechanisms determining the circle of life of the Green Deal project. We need to use our curiosity and the weapons of research, creating understandings and challenging our own worldviews (and hypotheses 12). Academic scholarship is slow, and often retrospective. This essay was written quickly – to be challenged by thorough research subsequently.

And yet, I do not want to leave it here with the mantra of “more research is needed” only. There are some lessons to be learnt from the Green Deal and recent developments for future EU environmental policy making. These lessons do relate to key buzzwords in the debate on “good” governance: transparency, participation, and environmental justice.

First, there is a necessity to become more explicit about trade-offs involved in environmental transformations. As a political science scholar, I mistrust any larger policy project that comes with a win-win narrative. The strong connection of economic and environmental aspects in the Green Deal – reinforced by Baptist-Bootleggers politics – indicates how much environmental transformation is connected to socio-economic change. Substantial change and substantial gain, however, come with social costs. Not being explicit about that will increase resistance amongst those that feel threatened – be it the employees of unsustainable industries, land-owners geared towards intense production over decades, people living “rural” lifestyles, landscape lovers being concerned about the expansion of wind energy, or anyone living in an old house with little energy efficiency. Green transformation projects are challenging for these groups, and win-win narratives prevent potential victims from making their arguments heard. However, the resistance of such marginalized groups, when mobilized by anti-environmental economic lobbies, can find broad societal support, and is now shattering the Green Deal. Hollowed out, it may now even let those European citizens who supported the environmental transition down – at least for nature conservation and forests within the EU.

To shed light on such patterns, including winners and losers of transformations – is a key requisite for further democratizing environmental policy making. The concern is transparency, and science can play a crucial role there. And this is not only about the social dimension.

In my field, essential questions (e.g. has forest harvesting increased or decreased in Europe; is forest biodiversity increasing or decreasing; do current forest and conservation policies work; what are the socio-economic conditions of the workforce in forestry) are not or only insufficiently answered. Moreover, such questions are subject to knowledge controversies fueling them with (stealth) science advocacy supporting different interests. This is not to say that science should not advocate. Yet, it feels embarrassing that it seems impossible to provide responses that would be accepted across sectoral camps – beyond industry lyrics and environmental alarmism. Knowledge is power; providing better knowledge to Europe’s citizens means empowering them. I do not think that better knowledge resolves conflicts or makes trade-offs disappear. But I argue that better knowledge increases understanding and trust, and empowers EU citizens to contribute to the debate. Better knowledge, and transparency, are imperative for creating the social license for future environmental transformation projects.

Second, a weakness of Green Deal politics is that they were prepared as a cocktail of bureaucratic, economic and environmental interests, resulting in limited direct engagement with broader society. This is striking for forests and nature, which — if we trust our own sociological research— are important for many European citizens. It is remarkable how little we can find on societal participation and empowerment in the key EU strategies for forests and nature. There are all the good ambitions in these strategies, but there is nothing on societal participation or community empowerment. Why do we want to empower communities and Indigenous People in Central Africa (in development collaboration), while we think experts (or markets and industry) do a better job within the EU?

We should think about EU forest and nature policies which encourage local and broad societal participation. We could think about European Referenda on key issues relating to our environment. It is the lack of public participation which is currently turning the tides against Green Deal flagship conservation projects. Would policy makers be so afraid of voters if these voters would have decided on the priorities themselves? This is not to say that we should replace expertise by public license, and parliamentarian representation by public referenda. This is also not to say that we can expect public participation to result in more “pro-environment” outcomes in all cases. But then we can blame ourselves – as citizens – for anti-environmental policy decisions, instead of blaming Brussels for questionable lobbies. We need to dare more to involve citizens directly in these questions than we currently do. Why should Europeans not have a more direct say on what concerns all of them, and the nature they live in?

Third, there is an increasing environmental justice issue connected to the hollowing of the Green Deal. A double moral is increasingly apparent for forests and nature specifically. Why do we render shifting cultivation as (potentially) illegal under the Deforestation Regulation, but large-scale clearcutting in Europe as sustainable – as all attempts to clearly define sustainable forest management within the EU have failed again? Inner and outer consistency is critical in any ambition for credible environmental leadership globally. Ecological modernization may be the way to go for European politics, and perhaps the only way that a majority of citizens is willing to support. But putting socio-economic burdens of conservation beyond European boarders while not being willing or able to regulate apparent trade-offs at home is unjust. It will jeopardize the ambition to lead a global sustainability transition when it comes to nature and forests – and it will make it easy for those exploiting nature abroad to render EU policies as postcolonial and merely motivated by protectionism. Perhaps this moral collapse could be a fifth hypotheses for the hollowing out of the Green Deal – delegitimizing environmental leadership globally. I do not hope so.

Conclusion: waking up Totoro

How shall I conclude? I would like to return to the initial forest metaphor: the hollow tree. Hollow trees are a critical part of the circle of life in a forest, providing shelter to manifold organisms, and sometimes form the seedbed for the next generations of trees. In the wonderful Japanese movie “My Neighbour Totoro”, directed by Hayao Miyazaki, a majestic hollow camphor tree is the home of the magical being Totoro. Only children can find Totoro in the hollow tree, and only children can wake him up to help solve troublesome situations.

I think it is time to wake up Totoro in EU forest and nature politics. We need to green Europe from inside – by being more transparent, more inclusive, and more just. Perhaps it needs a next generation to find a new spirit in the hollow tree, a new generation of students and scholars to wake up Totoro. This essay was meant to provide thoughts – also for them. I remain optimist for a greener Europe!

References

Berning, L., & Sotirov, M. (2024). The coalitional politics of the European Union Regulation on deforestation-free products. Forest Policy and Economics, 158, 103102.

Politico (2024): Von der Leyen finally stands up for nature law — just as it may fall. (accessed 29-04-2024)

The Guardian (2024): The Guardian view on Europe’s troubled green deal: make the case, not concessions. Editorial. Article published 9-4-2024 (accessed 19-04-2024).

Sotirov, M., Winkel, G., & Eckerberg, K. (2021). The coalitional politics of the European Union’s environmental forest policy: Biodiversity conservation, timber legality, and climate protection. Ambio, 50(12), 2153-2167.

Totoro picture: Isaak Yuen (2012): Children and Nature: My neighbor Totoro https://ekostories.com/2012/04/13/children-nature-totoro/ (accessed 03-05-2024)

Yandle, B. (1999). Bootleggers and Baptists in retrospect. Regulation, 22, 5.

I am grateful to Metodi Sotirov, University of Freiburg, Sven Wunder, European Forest Institute, Jelle Behagel and George Iordachescu, both Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group at Wageningen, for comments on an earlier version of this essay. I also thank Keen-mun Poon for editing the final text.